al-Mujallad al-awwal. Muqaddimāt al-taḥqīq wa-muqaddimat al-Imām al-Zubaydī lil-Itḥāf -- al-mujallad al-thānī. Kitāb al-ʻIlm ilá nihāyat al-bāb al-thālith -- al-mujallad al-thālith. Tatimmat kitāb al-ʻilm min al-bāb al-rābiʻ ilá ākhir al-kitāb -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ. Kitāb Qawāʻid al-ʻaqāʼid -- al-mujallad al-khāmis. Kitāb Asrār al-ṭahārah -- al-mujallad al-sādis. Kitāb Asrār al-ṣalāh ilá nihāyat shurūṭ al-jumʻah min al-bāb al-khāmis -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ. Tatimmat kitāb asrār al-ṣalāh min ādāb al-jumʻah ilá ākhir al-kitāb -- al-mujallad al-thāmin. Kitābā Asrār al-zakāh wa-asrār al-ṣawm -- al-mujallad al- tāsiʻ. Kitāb asrār (...) al-ḥajj -- al-mujallad al-ʻāshir. Kitābā ādāb tilāwat al-Qurʼān wa-al-adhkār wa-al-daʻawāt -- al-mujallad al-ḥādī ʻashar. Kitābā tartīb al-awrād wa-tafḍīl iḥyāʼ al-layl wa-ādāb al-akl -- al-mujalladal-thānī ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-Nikāḥ wa-ādāb al-Kasb wa-al-maʻāsh -- al-mujallad al-thālith ʻashar. Kitāb al-Ḥalāl wa-al-ḥarām -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ ʻashar. Kitāb al-Ulfah wa-al-ukhuwwah -- al-mujallad al-khāmis ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-ʻUzlah wa-ādāb al-Safar -- al-mujallad al-sādis ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-Samāʻ wa-al-wajd wa-al-Amr bi-al-maʻrūf wa-al-nahy ʻan al-munkar -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-maʻīshah wa-akhlāq al-nubūwah wa-sharḥ ʻajāʼib al-qalb -- al-mujallad al-thāmin ʻashar. Kitābā riyāḍat al-nafs wa-tahdhīb al-akhlāq wa-kasr al-shahwatayn -- al-mujallad al-tāsiʻ ʻashar. Kitābā āfāt al-lisān wa-dhamm al-ghaḍab -- al-mujallad al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-dunyā wa-dhamm al-bukhl -- al-mujallad al-ḥādī wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-jāh wa-dhamm al-kibr wa-al-ʻajab -- al-mujallad al-thānī wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-ghurūr wa-al-tawbah -- al-mujallad al-thālith wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā al-ṣabr wa-al-shukr -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā al-rajā wa-al-khawf -- al-mujallad al-khāmis wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-zuhd wa-al-faqr -- al-mujallad al-sādis wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa al-tawakkul -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-maḥabbah wa-al-shawq wa-al-uns wa-al-riḍā -- al-mujallad al-thāmin wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kutub al-ikhlāṣ wa-al-nīyah wa-al-murāqabah wa-al-muḥāsabah wa-al-tafakkur -- al-mujallad al- tāsiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb dhikr al-mawt wa-mā baʻdih ilá nihāyat al-bāb al-thāmin -- al-mujallad al-thalāthūn. Kitāb dhikr al-mawt wa-mā baʻdih ilá ākhar al-kitāb wa-yalīhi maṣādir al-taḥqīq. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

Caliphate; Māwardī, ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad, 974?-1058; political and social views.

[1] al-Manṭiq. 1. al-Madkhal. 2. al-Maqūlāt. 3. al-ʻIbārah. 4. al-Qiyās. 5. al-Burhān. 6. al-Jadal. 7. al-Safsaṭah. 8. al-Khaṭābah. 9. al-Shiʻr (4 v.) -- [2] al-Ṭabīʻīyat. 2. al-Samāʼ wa-al-ʻālam. 3. al-Kawn wa-al-fasād. 4. al-Afʻāl wa-al-infiʻālāt. 5. al-Maʻādin wa-al-āthār al-ʻulwīyah. 6. al-Nafs. 7. al-Nabāt -- [3] al-Riyāḍīyāt. [1] Uṣūl al-handasah. 2. al-Ḥisāb. 3. Jawāmiʻ ʻilm al-mūsīqá. [4] al-Ilāhīyāt.

Each narration or text, as it informs about an event, situation or person in history, has a history that sheds light on both its formation and how it arrived to us. The illumination of this history is at least as important as the content analysis of the information. For this reason, it is necessary both to examine whether the source in which the information is given has survived to the present day as it was created by the author without being (...) exposed to any external intervention, and to analyze the narration in terms of reliability and indication within the integrity of the isnād-text. In that case, when the word “text criticism” is mentioned, an understanding of a specific criticism should come to mind, which includes both critical edition (scholarly editing) of the first source and the critique of the narration by making sound research in terms of isnād and literary criticism (naqd al-isnād wa-l-matn). Due to reasons such as the inability to follow a standard method, the limited number of the copies and/or the distance of the copies from the author in terms of history and commercial concerns, many classical works published with relative verification contain such errors require a re-examination. One of these works is Ibn Hibbān’s (d. 354/965) book al-Majrūhīn. In his work al-Majrūhīn, Ibn Hibbān divided the narrators into two groups according to their reliability and collected the ones that he determined as weak according to his opinion. In this work, he placed Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) at the top of the list. First, he denounced Abū Ḥanīfa with the following expressions: Sahib al-ra’y, child of slaves, bicker, hypocrite, had little knowledge of hadith, a Murji’ī propagandist, a narrator who was blamed by imams. Then he tried to justify these claims by about thirty narrations from various salaf scholars. These narratives are completely different from the largely intellecutal discussions and criticisms of scholars such as al-Awza'i (d. 157/774), Ibn Abī Laylā (d. 148/765) and Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849) on Abu Ḥanīfa and his school. The narrations compiled by Ibn Hibbān are display insulting and polemical narrations against Abu Ḥanīfa’s personality and reliability. In terms of being a source for later periods, it is important to examine and criticize these narratives in terms of the narration techniques. The al-jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl is important part of the hadith science. al-Mejrūhīn, one of the leading works of this science is remarkable in many respects. According to this narration Abū Ḥanīfa Nuʿmān b. S̱ābit b. Zūtā b. Māh’ın (öl. 150/767) said, "If a man worships this mule to get closer to Allah, I see no harm in it." According to our analysis, there are the following determinations about the narrators in the chain of this narrative. Ibn Abī Mushir is unknown (majhūl), the narrator who is written as “Mahfūz b. Abī Savba” but his correct name is “Tawba” is matrūk. Ahmad b. al-Walīd al-Mahramī al-Karkhī is weak, and Yahyā b. Hamza, source person, is qadari who narrates from people with munkar al-hadith; but is also considered as a thiḳa narrator. As for Sa‘īd b. Abd al-Azīz, he has nothing to do with the reception and transmission of the narrative. In addition, there is also a break in the chain. First of all, what is expected from a basic work such as al-Majrūhīn, whose subject and purpose is purely a narrator analysis, is that the report in it should be acceptable, at least in terms of isnād. When the narrative in question, which is also included in earlier sources such as al-Fesewī (d. 277/890), is evaluated in terms of both the isnād and the text, one realizes the transformation of an expression circulating in the form of gossip against Abu Ḥanīfa in Damascus around the subject of ʾirjāʾ. ʾIrjāʾ was at the forefront of the heated debates in the second half of the second century into semā form in terms of isnād and text, besides, the word النعل/clog is transformed into البغل/mule. Apart from the weak points of the chain, Sa‘īd b. Abd al-Azīz, who has nothing to do with the reception and transmission of the narrative, has also been turned into the narrator/source of the report with the samā expression. Regardless of the purpose and the criteria of the narration technically, during the conversation with Sa‘īd, Yahyā b. Hamza’s sincere friend and teacher, a special speech in which a common report attributed to Abu Ḥanīfa was expressed, was transformed into Yahyâ’s samā‘ in the form of jazm. As a result, the word “shoe” or “clog” has evolved into mule. It would be a reductionist and over optimistic approach to assume that all this may have resulted from tashīf and tahrīf of the copyists. The narration we discussed is a typical example in terms of showing the effect of the conflict of ideas between Ahl al-Hadīth and Ahl ar-Ra’y on the narrations. Of course, this shoud be not regarded as the only example. (shrink)

This article aims at examining the limits of change in the field of worship through a study on the origins of the ḥukm[religious ruling] of Shawwāl fasting that is widely practiced in the different parts of Muslim world. The study, firstly, deals with the evolution of the ḥukm of Shawwāl fasting chronologically among four sunnī schools of law, then analyzes the solitary reports on the topic. It concludes that in Mālikīand Ḥanefīschools, the ḥukm of this specific worship changed within the (...) limits of karāha [reprehensibility], ibāha [permissibility], and nadb [recommendation]. This ḥukm was constructed based on solitary reports which later became a paradigmatic source of religious legitimacy in the Ḥanbalīschool beginning with the eponymous Imām and in the Shāfiʿīlong after the founding authorities. It also claims that it is strongly probable that the solitary reports on the topic go back to a deduced opinion in the age of companions, but then reached to a form of prophetic solitary report in the corpus of hadīth reports. Ultimately, this specific worship that has restricted number of fasting was established with the paradigmatic effect of the approach to solitary reports as the only authentic way of transmitting the sunna, even though it is at odds with the fact that this worship had not been implemented in the first two centuries after hijra, i.e. contrary to the established practice [ʿamal]. Summary: The issue of change of rulings in Islamic law comes up frequently on various occasions, and an increasing number of academic studies are trying to determine the characteristics and limits of this change in numerous books, articles and papers. These studies mostly seem to focus on bringing together the arguments that can be compiled under the title of ‘the flexibility of Islamic law in response to the challenges of modernity’. Although the change of rulings in Islamic law is an undeniable fact, reading it only from the lens of the change in Islamic law depending on the requirements of time is an inadequate reading. The change of rulings in Islamic law has different motives; and the change of time, more precisely the change of custom, is only one of them.On the other hand, another issue that comes up in relation to the change of rulings is the claim that this change can only take place in terms of the rulings regulating the interpersonal relations, i.e. muʿāmalāt. In fact, this claim relies on the abovementioned approach that limits the change in Islamic law with the change of custom. Hence, because other two main areas of Islamic law, worships (ʿibādāt) and punishments (ʿuqūbāt) are not open to change through custom, their rulings will not change at all. This article will try to reveal that the change in rulings might reside in a sort of another change emerged in relation to the sources of these rulings, which is a neglected point. Thus, by exposing that the field of worships which is mostly considered as a closed area for change in rulings is actually open to it, this article will examine the limits of this change.For this analysis, the article deals with the fasting of six days in the month of Shawwāl as an example, which is widely practiced in various parts of the Islamic world. The main evidence on which this fasting is based on is a report transmitted in the considerably authentic hadith sources of Ahl al-Sunnah, which reads as follows “Whoever fasts the Ramaḍān and adds six days from Shawwāl, will get reward of the entire year”. This fasting, which is the subject of a great agreement on its ruling as recommended (mustaḥāb) practice today, was actually regarded as reprehensible (makrūh) by the two great eponymous jurists of the first two schools of law in the second Hijrī century, namely Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa. In his al-Muwaṭṭaʾ,Mālik clearly expresses that he did not recognize any scholar who keeps this fast, and that no [authentic] report has reached him on this. The fact that both Mālik b. Anas and Abū Ḥanīfa declared an opinion on the subject shows that this practice started to appear in the first half of the second ḥijrī century as a practice or as a solitary report (khabar al-wāḥid). However, both imāms have stated that such a specific worship would be makrūh. In spite of these very sharp expressions, the schools of law, which were founded by the followers of these two eponymous scholars, abandoned their views and widely accepted Shawwāl fasting as mustaḥāb. This article examines why this sharp change occurred in a worship in the schools of law and in which way it took place.Accordingly, the fundamental motive in this change is a paradigmatic transformation in understanding and identifying the sunna as a source of normativity. Although an agreement was formed on the validity of solitary reports as a source of knowledge in the second ḥijrī century, it was not yet accepted that these narrations are identical to sunna as a source of normativity. For that reason, both Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik did not hesitate to reject any solitary report that contradicted a stronger evidence. However, as a result of the extraordinary efforts of Ahl al-Ḥadīth, the epistemic value of solitary reports has reached to an authority equating them to the sunna with a very rapid acceleration as of the end of the second century and throughout the third century. This situation led later scholars of schools to abandon the views of the eponymous scholars of these schools on certain topics in favor of certain solitary reports. This was also the process for the change in Shawwāl fasting.This thesis will be put under two headings, a section that tries to determine the periods and processes for the Sunnī schools of law in considering this fasting as mustaḥāb; and another section that provides an evaluation of transmitted reports in relation to the Shawwāl fasting. Accordingly, in the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools, due to the effect of the reports, the ruling of Shawwāl fasting has been transformed from makrūh into the mustaḥāb as a result of the interpretational activities that started in the fourth ḥijrī century. Shawwāl fasting was accepted as mustaḥāb in the Shāfiʿī school, although there was no transmitted opinion on the subject from the founding imāms, in the fifth ḥijrī century; and in the Ḥanbalī school directly by the founding imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, whose main aim was to follow a concept of religion that puts the transmitted reports at the center. When the reports on the subject are examined, it demonstrates that the mustaḥāb ruling is mainly rooted in a report by Saʿd b. Saʿīd transmitted in the famous hadīth compilations including Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ.Yet, this report was criticized in its both chain and text. Combining the facts that the same report with the same chain was also transmitted as the words of the companion in some sources and the verse that declares good deed will be rewarded ten times higher than what it deserves will make the following explanation a valid one: As Mālik put it such a fasting practice was commonly unknown to the Muslim society in the first two centuries after the ḥijra. Sometime after the death of the Prophet, an inference was made probably by a companion(s) as that it would be a good deed if someone who fasted an entire month already and got used to the fasting to fast six more days in order to get a reward of fasting for the entire year according to the verse that rewards good deeds with ten times higher. Since it is a recommended practice in essence, i.e. fasting for the sake of Allah, this inference transformed into a report and easily passed through the filters of hadīth scholars who are linked to a sort of piety promoting worships among people. After the solitary reports gained an authority to the extent that they can rarely be challenged, the followers of later schools of law preferred to get in a process of re-interpreting the opinions of their imāms in order either to reconcile them with the content of report, or at least to show why these imāms actually spoke against this fasting. Eventually, the later scholars of madhhab decided for the standard opinion of the madhhab depending on the reports in favor of the Shawwāl fasting rather than following their eponymous imāms. (shrink)

Study on the concept of delusion (Moha) and Mokṣa in Indic philosophy.

Talvez o paralelo mais próximo do Logos joanino no Islã seja encontrado na noção da "Realidade Muhammadana" (al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyya). O termo foi provavelmente usado pela primeira vez por Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240), mas a explicação detalhada mais antiga do que ela representa foi fornecida por Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad Farghānī (d. 1300), um excelente aluno do principal propagador de Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qûnawī. Farghānī escreveu um comentário denso, em dois volumes, sobre a famosa qasida de 760 versos de Ibn al-Fāriḍ, (...) Naẓm al-sulûk. Profundamente enraizado na metafísica islâmica, na teologia e na psicologia espiritual, o comentário explica como o poeta está descrevendo o arquétipo eterno de Muhammad em Deus como o meio pelo qual Deus cria o universo e o lugar de retorno final de todas as coisas. (shrink)

The passionate and staunch defence of logic of the controversial thinker Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd of Córdoba (384-456/994-1064), had lasting consequences in the Islamic world. Indeed, his book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples (Kitāb al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq wa-l-mudkhal ilayhi bi-l-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmiyya wa-l-amthila al-fiqhiyya), composed in 1025-1029, was well known and discussed during and after his time; and it paved the way for the studies (...) of his compatriots Ibn Bājjah (d. 1138), Ibn Ṭufayl (1185), and Ibn Rushd (1198), who each gave demonstrative reasoning a privileged place within the methods of attaining knowledge. Unfortunately, as too often in the history of science, Ibn Ḥazm’s innovative perspectives and contributions in logic have been overlooked or considered with an attitude of contempt. On the one hand, his work has been seen, at best, as promulgating the benefits of studying Aristotle’s logic, so that his contribution is assessed as more didactical than conceptual. And on the other hand, those who do examine his innovations often consider them to be mistaken. As indicated by Chejne (1984, p. 2) contempt towards the logical work of Ibn Ḥazm was also present in its reception by the Eastern philosophers who accused him of deviating from Aristotelian logic and of dabbling in things beyond his capability. However, a reassessment of his work on logic has since begun, by delving into the ways the thinker of Córdoba studied the links between deontic and modal qualification of propositions. In this context Lameer’s (2013) paper on the logical sources of Ibn Ḥazm is worth mentioning; the author (p. 417, footnote 1) observes that, although, strictly speaking, it was al-Fārābī who first drew the parallelism between deontic and modal concepts, it was Ibn Ḥazm who developed it and worked it out in a more precise manner. A primary aim of this paper is to help fill some of these gaps by stressing the role of the work of Ibn Ḥazm in developing a notion of deontic necessity deeply rooted in legal normativity, and in explicitly discussing the transference between deontic and modal concepts. According to our view; the basic units of Islamic deontic logic are what we might call, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives. As it turns out, the heteronomy of imperatives within Islamic legal systems contrasts with those of the purely moral realm, which seem to be closer to an autonomous conception of moral law. There it concurs again with Leibniz’s proposal to define obligatory as “what is necessary for a good person to do”. In the present paper, we will focus on the heteronomous imperatives of legal systems rather than on the imperatives of the purely moral realm. In this context, the work of Ibn Ḥazm extends the parallelism between the necessity of events and that of human actions stressed by his predecessors. According to our understanding, Ibn Ḥazm’s parallelism can be rendered explicit formally by means of a conditional (or hypothetical) structure shared by both deontic and modal propositions. Moreover, this structure makes apparent that this parallelism displays an underlying system of “degrees”. Indeed, while in the domain of events, given some conditions, it makes sense to distinguish between an event that is more likely to happen than another. Ibn Ḥazm speaks of near and distant possibility (such as the higher degree of likelihood of rain, given the condensation of clouds in December, and its lower degree, when the condensation occurs in summer); and, in the domain of actions, the Islamic notion of weighting actions determines degrees of virtue (or of legal and moral value). So whereas the degree of virtue of performing a forbidden act as determined by the distribution of sanction and reward is 0, we obtain the same value by pondering the likelihood of an impossible event to take place. Furthermore, as discussed in section II.3.2, the system of values at work in the parallelism can be seen as opening the way to a more direct correspondence. Thus, while in the realm of nature, likelihood of occurrence of an event is dependent upon the conditions specific to the occurrence of that event; while, in the realm of jurisprudence, likelihood of performing an action is dependent upon the distribution of reward and sanction specific to that action (being that, given the choice to perform or not perform a given action, those that will be rewarded are more likely to be performed than those that are not). According to this perspective, the point of the parallelism is that both deontic and modal qualifications measure the degree of an action or event to become actual; that is – indulging once more in anachronism (but this time from the Leibnizian background) – the degree measures how feasible (facile) an action or event may be. This suggests that Ibn Ḥazm’s perspectives already herald the links to probability and possibility explored by Leibniz six centuries later – see for example Leibniz’s (1671, A VI, I, p. 424-26) use of probability in the context of conditional right. Nevertheless, it also shows a crucial difference to the approach developed in the Elementa Jura Naturalis: whereas Leibniz’s studies seek to define what is to be just or virtuous, the logical system of deontic imperatives within Islamic jurisprudence presupposes that what is to be virtuous has already been settled. Determining what is to be virtuous is not achieved by logical reasoning within the system of legal jurisprudence, but by delving into the higher objectives of the Sharīʿa. While developing our point, we will delve into the logical structure of the heteronomous imperatives. This distinguishes our contribution from the existing literature, such as the papers of Chejne (1984), Lameer (2014), and Guerrero (1997, 2010, 2014), which do not provide a logical analysis of the deontic concepts put into work by Ibn Ḥazm. The true antecedent to the present paper is the work of Farid Zidani (2007, 2015), who, so far as we know, was the first to undertake such a task. Some of our own developments and general epistemological thoughts go beyond Ibn Ḥazm’s framework and motivations; mainly those contained in sections II.3.2 and IV. However, according to our view, these reflections suggest that Ibn Ḥazm’s approach has the substance for a broader and deeper exploration of the logic of norms. The paper is structured as follows:I.Ibn Ḥazm’s Logic of Heteronomous Imperatives. After presenting some extracts of the relevant text, we proceed by providing a formal reconstruction of the five forms of deontic modalities. II. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Norms. Duties and Modalities. In this section, we study the transferences from deontic to modal necessity and possibility. We briefly compare the deontic system of Islamic Jurisprudence with that of Leibniz.III. Leibniz and Hypothetical Imperatives in Law.IV. Beyond Ibn Ḥazm: Conclusions and the Work Ahead. We will conclude the paper by discussing briefly some conceptual points that distinguish the logic of heteronomous imperatives from contemporary deontic logic. Our final words will discuss deontic-modal parallelism in the context of Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of reasoning by conjecture and what we call “the internalization of nature.”. (shrink)

Letters, speeches, articles and memos written by a pioneer Muslim educationalist.

RésuméʾAbū Saʿīd al-Siǧzī, astronome et mathématicien du ive/xe siècle, fut l'un des premiers auteurs du genre ʿilm al-hayʾa ; mais on connaît peu la genèse de cette discipline et sa relation aux autres écrits et pratiques en astronomie. Dans cet article, je présente de nouvelles découvertes permettant de préciser la biographie d'al-Siǧzī. Je décris ensuite, pour la première fois, une composition d'astronomie théorique du ive/xe siècle, la « Structure des orbes » d'al-Siǧzī, et je montre sa place dans la formation (...) de la discipline ʿilm al-hayʾa en comparant ce livre à l'ouvrage antérieur d'al-Farġānī sur la taille de la Terre et le nombre des sphères célestes. Je conclus que la Tarkīb al-aflāk d'al-Siǧzī est le plus ancien exemple connu d'un livre traitant des sujets abordés plus tard en hayʾa, et qu'il contient peutêtre la première occurrence du neuvième orbe céleste, classique dans les écrits du genre. (shrink)

Research papers on various aspects of Hindu philosophy and Vedic literature.

1. Abt. Schriften zur reinen Philosophie. Bd. 1-8.--2. Abt. Schriften zur angewandten Philosophie I. Bd. 9-12.--3. Abt. Schriften zur angewandten Philosophie II. Bd. 13-17--4. Abt. Schriften zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Bd. 18-20--5. Abt. Popularphilosophische Schriften. Bd. 21-23.--6. Abt. Polemische Schriften, Rezensionen, politische Flugschriften, Ansprachen, Erklärungen, Aussagen und Schreiben, Reden, Nachträge und Miszellen, Briefe. Bd. 24-30.

Interpretation of Hetvābhāsasāmānyanirukti of Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent., treatise on Nyaya philosophy; based on other classical commentaries.

Les etudes sur Averroes (1126-1198) ont porte jusqu'ici, pour l'essentiel, soit sur un aspect de sa psychologie philosophique, soit sur sa doctrine politique. Le premier type d'etudes se situe dans le prolongement de la reception medievale latine d'Averroes, caracterisee par les controverses suscitees par sa noetique. Le second reflete un courant de la recherche qui a domine l'histoire recente de la philosophie arabe et qui a mis l'accent sur l'etude des rapports entre religion et philosophie. Sans negliger ces deux orientations, (...) ce volume, qui rassemble des contributions de specialistes mondialement reconnus d'Averroes, cherche ... donner une vision plus globale de cet auteur en etudiant toutes les facettes de son oeuvre. Il vise aussi ... reequilibrer l'approche de sa pensee, en insistant sur des aspects peu etudies de celle-ci et qui relevent de la logique, de la philosophie naturelle, de la medecine ou de la methodologie juridique. Les etudes ici rassemblees contribuent ainsi ... jeter une lumiere neuve sur cette figure marquante de la pensee universelle. Les etudes sur Averroes (1126-1198) ont porte jusqu'ici, pour l'essentiel, soit sur un aspect de sa psychologie philosophique, soit sur sa doctrine politique. Le premier type d'etudes se situe dans le prolongement de la reception medievale latine d'Averroes, caracterisee par les controverses suscitees par sa noetique. Le second reflete un courant de la recherche qui a domine l'histoire recente de la philosophie arabe et qui a mis l'accent sur l'etude des rapports entre religion et philosophie. Sans negliger ces deux orientations, ce volume, qui rassemble des contributions de specialistes mondialement reconnus d'Averroes, cherche ... donner une vision plus globale de cet auteur en etudiant toutes les facettes de son oeuvre. Il vise aussi ... reequilibrer l'approche de sa pensee, en insistant sur des aspects peu etudies de celle-ci et qui relevent de la logique, de la philosophie naturelle, de la medecine ou de la methodologie juridique. Les etudes ici rassemblees contribuent ainsi ... jeter une lumiere neuve sur cette figure marquante de la pensee universelle. (shrink)